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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARIAN S. GOELTZ,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 8408

CONTINENTAL BANK AND ·
TRUST COMPANY
Defendent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of
Marion S. Goeltz and against The Continental Bank
and Trust Company for the return by the said Bank
to said Marian S. Goeltz of 12 shares of Douglas
Aircraft Company common stock and 25 shares of
Goodyear Rubber Company stock held by the Bank
as pledged security on two promissory notes. The
principal issue raised by this appeal is the application of the Statute of Limitations to the plaintiffs
claimed cause of action.
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On or about July 10, 1947, Francis B. Goeltz,
who was then the husband of Marion S. Goeltz,
plaintiff herein, and who had been for some time
a customer of The Continental Bank and Trust
Company borrowed from the Bank the sum of $1,000
and executed a promissory note in that amount. The
note also bore the purported signature of Marian S.
Goeltz, as maker, and there was pledged as security
for the note 150 shares of The Knickerbocker Fund,
certificate No. 3670, 10 shares of Commercial Credit
Company, #CF 67287, and 25 shares of Mountain
Fuel Supply Company. All of these certificates were
in the name of Marian S. Goeltz and bor~ her purported signature in blank on the reverse. The proceeds of the loan were credited to Mr. Goeltz's account at the Bank. The loan was renewed in March,
1948 for the same amount and the same stock certificates were retained as pledged collateral. The note
was again renewed in August, 1948, with the same
stocks as collateral. An additional loan of $500 under
date of March 20, 1950, was made by the Bank to Mr.
Goeltz and secured by the same stock collateral.
Both the renewal note of August, 1948 and the new
note of March 20, 1950, bore the purported signature of Marian S. Goeltz, as co-maker. Payments
were made on both notes so that on December 22,
1952, the balance on the $1,000 had been reduced
to $883.08, and the balance on the $500 had been
2
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reduced to $215.75. No payments have been received
since that date.
The particular stocks which had been pledged
with the Bank vv-ere the individual property of :rvirs.
Goeltz and had been held for her at the brokerage
office of Ure, Pett and Morris, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Francis Bo Goeltz, her husband, had been assisting
her in the handling of her individual estate and had
access to that brokerage account.
In October, 1950, Mrs. Goeltz, by then separated
from her husband, had changed brokerage houses
to J. A. Hogle and Con1pany and on the advice of
Mr. Beck of that company, had determined to sell
her Knickerbocker Fund and Commercial Credit
Company stock. At that time she found that the
stock certificates were not in the possession of Ure,
Pett and Morris but were in the hands of The Continental Bank and Trust Company as collateral
security for the notes. Upon an agreement with Mr.
W. E. Gile, vice president of the Bank, she substituted for the stock previously held by the Bank, six
shares of Douglas Aircraft Company and twentyfive shares of Goodyear Rubber, which are the subject of the action, and the other shares were released
to her. ~~umerous efforts were made by the Bank
between that time and September 29, 1953, when
this suit was filed, to obtain payment and the balance
due on the notes from Mr. Goeltz, but to no avail.

3
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In September, 1953, Mrs. Goeltz brought this
action against the Bani{ for the return of the certificates. The Bank defended on the ground that they
had a valid pledge, that the original certificates
were endorsed in blank by Mrs. Goeltz, thus making
them fully negotiable, and also asserted laches on
the part of Mrs. Goeltz. The answer of the Bank
was not filed until after the deposition of Mrs. Goeltz
had been taken at which time she stated that the
certificates which had been originally pledged to the
Bank had been endorsed by her in blank prior to the
time they were delivered to Ure, Pett and Morris.
Also, during the course of that deposition she denied
that the signatures on the notes were hers. When
the matter came on for trial, Mrs. Goeltz changed
her story as to the signatures on one of the stock
certificates and a recess was taken by the court to
obtain photostatic copies from the transfer agent
of all the certificates which had been originally
pledged with the Bank and later released to Mrs.
Goeltz for the purpose of examining the signatures
on the stock certificates. When these certificates
were produced at the second stage of the trial, it
was established from the testimony of plaintiff and
the expert witness introduced by Mrs. Goeltz, that
the signatures. on two of the stock certificates, i.e.
the Mountain Fuel Supply Company certificate and
Commercial Credit certificate, were not, in fact,
4
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hers. Whereupon (R. 138) the Bank moved to amend
its answer and particularly its third defense to allege, in addition to the doctrine of laches, the statute
of limitations on the ground that the certificate,
being wrongfully pledged in 1947 by Mr. Goeltz,
such act constituted a conversion by the Bank as
well as Mr. Goeltz and that the statute (78-1226(2) ) started to run on that date. This motion
for leave to amend was taken under advisement by
the trial court and later denied.
Having denied the defense of the statute of limitations, the court found that both the signatures on
the promissory notes and the signatures on the stock
certificates originally pledged with the Bank were
forged and that the Bank acquired no rights thereby. Having so determined, the court ordered judg
ment in favor of the plaintiff for return of such
stock certificates.
Defendant Banl{ appeals from this judgment on
the ground that the court erred in failing to allow
it to amend and set up the statute of limitations and
the court failed to apply the doctrine of laches or
estoppel to plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BANI{.
II. TI-IE TRIAL COUf~T ERRED IN REFUSING
TO ALLOW DEFENDANT BANK TO AMEND ITS
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ANSWER TO ASSERT THE STATUTE OF LilVIIT ATIONS.
III. PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING
THE VALIDITY OF THE PLEDGE OF THE KNICKERBOCKER FUND STOCK.
IV. THE BANK HAD NO NOTICE OF INFIRMITY IN THE KNICKERBOCKER FUND CERTIFICATE.

ARGUMENT
I. 'rHE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK.

As this is an action for conversion of personal
property, the appropriate section of the Statute of
Limitations is 78-12-26(2) Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which fixes the period as three years. The sole
issue under the facts established is the date on which
the statute commenced to run.
It is defendant Bank's position that the wrongful pledge of stolen or converted securities by Francis B. Goeltz on July 10, 1947, constituted a conversion by the pledgee as well as by the pledgor and
started the running of the statute at that time. It is
well established that in the case of a wrongful pledge
of stolen or converted property of another, the
pledgee's position is wrongful from the outset and
the Statute of Limitations begins to run at once
against an action for conversion and no subsequent
demand or refusal can start it afresh. O'Connell v.
Chicago Park District, 34 N.E. 2d 836, 135 A.L.R.
698, 376 Ill. 550 ( 1941). This case holds, among
6
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other things, that where the pledge is invalid ab init'io
so that the pledgee's possession is wrongful, the Statute of Limitations co1nmenced to run at that time
and the subsequent refusal of the pledgee to release
the pledged property upon demand of the rightful
owner does not give rise to a cause of action for conversion different and distinct from the cause of action occasioned by the rnere wrongful possession of
the pledged property.
The leading Utah case on the subject, Dee v.
llyland 3 Utah 308, 3 P. 388 involved a purchase
rather than a pledge by the defendant, but the principle is the sameo As was said by the Supren1e Court
of the United States in Warner v. Martin, 11 Howard, 209, 13 L. Ed. 667:
"A factor or agent who has power to sell
the produce of his principal has no povver to
affect the property by tortiously pledging it
as security or satisfaction for a debt of his
own, and it is of no consequence that the
pledgee is ignorant of the factor's not being
the ovvner. Paterson v. Tash, Str. 1178; Maans
v. Henderson, 1 East, 337; Newson v. Thornton, 6 East, 17; 2 Smith 207; McCombie v.
Davies, 6 Eeast, 538; 7 East, 5; Daubigny v.
Duval, 5 T.R. 604; 1 Maule & Selw, 140, 147;
2 Stark. 539; Guichard v. Morgan, 4 Moore,
36; 2 Brod. & Bingh. 639; 5 Ves. Jun. 213.
\Vhen goods are so pledged or disposed of,
the principal may recover them back by an
action of trover against the pawnee, without
tendering to the factor vvhat may be due to
him, and vvithout any tender to the pawnee of
the sum for whjch the goods were pledged
7
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(Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T.R. 604); or without
any demand of such goods ( 6 East, 538; 12
Mod.) and it is no excuse that the pawnee
was wholly ignorant that he who held the
goods held them as a mere agent or factor
(Martine 1. Coles, 1 Maule & Selw. 140), unless, indeed, where principal ( 6 Maule & Selw.
147).
In Dee v. Hyland, supra this court said:
''Which of these parties, plaintiff or defen.dant, both innocent and without fault,
must be the loser?

* * *

"Does the fact that the plaintiff did not
know who had the horse, nor where it was
affect the rights of either party to this action,
as to the statute of limitations pleaded as a
bar? The statute contains no exception exempting plaintiffs, who are ignorant of the
facts necessary to give them a right of action
from its limitations, and there is none implied by law unless that ignorance is occasioned by some improper conduct of the defendant. * * * Where there is no proof of fraud
on the part of the defendant, the general rule
is that the time of limitation runs from the
time of the commission of the wrong/ttl act,
or the right of action accrues, and not from
the time of the knowledge of the act by the
plaintiff, there being no proof of any wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant by
means of which that knowledge is concealed
from the plaintiff." (emphasis supplied)
To the same effect are Williams v. Harper Bros.
Automobile Dealers, Okla~ 27.6 P. 2d 217 (1954)
and Bennett v. Meeker, Mont. 202 P. 204. There is

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no question or claim in this case that The Continental Bank in accepting the pledge of the property was
other than in good faith. As this Court has stated,
and it is the well recognized majority rule, ignorance of the plaintiff in such situation does not prevent the Statute from running. Falls Branch Coal
Co. v. Proctor Coal Co. 203 Ky. 307~ 262 S.W. 300
37 A.L.R. 1172; Industrial Chrome Plating Co. v.
North, (Oreg. 1944), 153 P: 2d 835, 156 A.L.R.-250;
International Agr. Corp. v. Lockhart, 188 S. E. 243
(S. C.). See ·annotation in 136 ALR, 658.
II. TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO ALLOW DEFENDANT BANI( TO AMEND ITS
ANSWER TO ASSERT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

It being clear that the claim of the plaintiff is
barred by the statute of limitations, it is equally
clear that the trial court erred in refusing to allow
defendant Bank to amend its answer to set forth
expressly that defense.
The case first came on for trial on October 29,
1954. At that hearing plaintiff Marian S. Goeltz
testified that the three stock certificates which had
been originally pledged to the Bank by her husband
with her signature in blank thereon, were her own
property and they had been placed by her with Ure,
Pett and Morris since 1945. She also testified that
the Knickerbocker Fund and the Commercial Credit
stock certificates had been endorsed in blank by her
9
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when she placed them with the brokerage firm ( R.
48), but that the Mountain Fuel Supply certificate
had not been so endorsed (R.50, 61). As she had
previously testified in her deposition (p. 5, 22) that
she had endorsed all three certificates, the trial court
continued the hearing until the certificates in question, which Mrs. Goeltz had in the meantime sold,
could be obtained from the transfer agent for the
respective companies. At the second hearing on January 19, 1955, Mrs. Goeltz (R. 135) and the signature expert (R. 138) established that the signatures
on not only the Mountain Fuel, but also the Commercial Credit certificates were forged. Thereupon defendant Bank (R. 138) moved to amend its answe1
to assert the statute of limitations to conform to the
evidence produced by the plaintiff at the second
hearing. The position of the bank was stated by its
conusel in open court at the time the motion for leave
to amend was made, as follows:
"MR. BILLINGS. I would like leave at
this time, I sort of anticipated that this is
what the evidence would be, and since our
last recess I would like leave at this time to
amend our answer to conform to the evidence
which has been adduced here today. We had
originally set up as our third defense the Doctrine of Laches, that is that Mrs. Goeltz was
on notice as early as 1947 that her husband
was playing around with her stock as she testified. Now we want leave to express the Statute of Limitations as the evidence shows that

10
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this stock was originally pledged in 1946. The
notes that are in evedence and the testimony
was that they are renewals, they are dated
1947 and 1950, and since that they were forgeries from the beginning that was an unlawful pledge, he had no authority to pledge
them, and the cause of action arose with the
pledge and not at any subsequent date and so
that the statute whether you take the three
year statute for the refusal to deliver personally property the conversion of the personal
property which the pledge would be in 1947,
1946 or the fourth year, the statute acts as
not otherwise provided by law either one of
the statutes would have run before this action
was filed in 1953." ( R. 138)
"MR. BILLINGS: Well, I briefed it some,.
what myself and I have no objection. The
point is, Your Honor, we took Mrs. Goeltz's
deposition and at the time she testified that
she had signed them and we set up our defense that we were bona fide pledgees for
value, now we come and get the certificates
and find that they were forgeries. We didn't
know it until we got the certificates." (R.
140)
Under Rule 15 (a) "leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.
As stated in Moore's Federal Practice, Second
Edition, § 15:
''The courts have shown a 'strong liberality .. .in allowing amendments under Rule
15 (a)' * * * For example, the defendant may
be permitted to amend his answer to set up an
additional defense* * *
ll
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"Allowance of an1endments lies in the discretion of the trial court, and refusal to permit amendment is 11ot subject to review on
appeal except for abuse of discretion. Nevertheless the courts are required to allow amendments freely, and refusal should be placed
on some valid ground, as that the party has
had a sufficient opportunity to state a claim
and has failed, or that the amendment is not
offered in good faith, or will result in prejudice. It has been said that the fact that an
amendment is insufficient in law is not a
ground for refusing leave to file it. But the
court may, if it sees fit, deny leave. If the
amendment would be. subject to a motion to
dismiss, it would be an idle move for the court
to allow the amendment, and refusal to grant
leave to amend in such a case has been held
no abuse of discretion.
"Laches and delay may, of course, bar a
. proposed amendment. The mere fact that an
amendment is offered late in the case is, however, not enough to bar it; amendments may
be offered at the trial, or even after reversal
and remand.''
It is stated that the mere fact that an amendment is offered late in the case is not enough to bar
it and refusal to allow such amendment is an abuse
of discretion. Lloyd v. United Liquor Corp. 203 F.
2d 789 (C. A. -6, 1953). The-important factor is
v;hetl1er any prejudice will result which cannot be
eliminated by the conditions attached to the granting the motion. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Patterso11
Sgt. Co. 10 F.R.D. 534.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is subn1itted that the situation in the case at
bar clearly appears a proper one to allow the motion
to an1end the answer. This court recognized the
propriety of such a motion long before the liberal
rules of civil procedure patterned on the Federal
Rules were adopted and allowed amendment to assert the statute of limitations when it constitutes
a valid defense. Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93
Utah 426, 73 P. 2d 1277.
In the case at bar, the defendant had filed its
answer only after taking of the plaintiff's deposition and had relied on her statement that all three
stock certificates had been signed in blank by her
in setting forth its defenses. Plaintiff was the only
one who could know the true facts as to her signatures. The certificates being signed in blank were
negotiated to Defendant Bank and the Bank could
rely on its position as a bona fide pledgee for value
under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, (Title 16,
Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953). It was
not until the trial, and, indeed, until the second
hearing that the true facts came out that the signatures on two of the stock certificates were forged.
Defendant Bank had already plead laches and the
only change by the amendment was a specific reference to the statute of limitations. Plaintiff was in
no vvay prejudiced by the proposed amend1nenL
Counsel for defendant did not press the court to rule
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immediately, but agreed that plaintiff might have
time to brief the issue. (R. 140).
As stated in 34 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions,
§ 447, generally a defendant will be permitted to
amend to _set up the bar of the statute of limitations
wh~re such procedure appears to be justified in the
mind of the court as being in furtherance of justice,
such a plea being said to be one to the merits. See
statement of the ·south Dakota Court in F. M. Slagle
& Co. v. Bushnell. 16 N.W. 2d 914.
''By th-e aid of such counsel the defense
has gained in favor. It has been said that the
statute of limitations should not be discriminated against but should be treated like
any:_ other defense. Thomas et al. v. Price, 33
Wash 459, 74 P. 563, 99 Am. St. Rep. 961.
This court has held it to be a meritorious defen~ and has affirmed a ruling allowing it
to be set up by amendment. Houts et al. v.
Bartle et al., 14 SD 322, 85 NW 591. That
ruling accords with the overwhelming weight
of authority. 34 Am Jur. 350; Walters v.
Webster, 52 Colo. 549, 123 P. 952, Ann. Cas.
1914 A 24. See Wrightson v. Dougherty, 5
Cal 2d 257, 54 P. 2d 13, and Davenport v.
Stratton (Cal. Sup. 149 P. 2d 4."
It cannot be disputed that the proposed amendment sets up a valid defense and was made as soon
as the facts were developed indicating the existence
of such a defense. Defendant Bank was not guilty
of any laches in asserting the defense, nor of any
attempt to surprise plaintiff. Full opportunity was
14
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given to plaintiff to meet the issue. As stated by
this court in Hayden v. Collins, 90 Utah, 238, 63
P. 2d 223, 225:
"* * * The defendent has been brought
into court and made to defend. Any set of
facts which he may set up, whether sounding
in contract or in tort and which tend to defeat the claim of the plaintiff, is permitted.
And if he should, for the time, fail to set up
some facts which would constitute an affirmative defense or counterclaim and then later
conclude that these facts would constitute a
good counterclaim or defense, he should be
able to do so as long as they are not advanced
as such a late day as to make the tardiness
prejudicial to the plaintiff. * * *"
It is sub1nitted that if the bar of the statute of
limitations is a valid defense, justice requires allowing the amendment to assert it. To deny justice
is to abuse discretion. As this court has heretofore
held, when the proposed amendment sets up a valid
defense or counterclaim, it is prejudicial error to
refuse to allow the amendment. Detroit Vapor Stove
Co. v. J. C. Weeter L~tmber Co. 61 Utah 503 (1923)
215 P. 995.
Quite aside from Rule 15 (a) is Rule 15 (b)
which is the express basis upon which defendant
Bank sought to assert the statute of limitations. In
llaslcins v. Rasberry, 119 F. 2d 803 (C. A. 9, 1941),
the Ninth Circuit construed Federal Rule 15 (b)
from which our own rule is taken to include the
15
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statute of limitations as a defense when facts were
proven to show its application. In that case, suit
was commenced to quiet title. As here, the defendant pleaded laches, but not expressly the statute
of limitations. The trial court ruled that the Nevada
statute applied and dismissed the action. On appeal,
plaintiff-appellant contended that the statute of
limitations should have been affirmatively pleaded.
With respect to this court's opinion at p. 805 stated:
"Appelant's only argument regarding appellee's contention that the cause is barred, is
that appellees waived the defense by failure
to plead it, because Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 8 (c) 28 U.S.C.A. following
section 733c, requires the statute of limitations to be affirmatively pleaded. Appellees
contend that the rule was complied with. We
think it unnecessary to decide whether the
pleading is sufficient, because Rule 15 (b) disposes of the contention in any event. That
rule provides in part : 'When iss11es not raised
bythe pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues * * *'
"We think and hold that the statute above
quoted bars the remedy invoked by appellant."
It is submftted therefore, that if the statute of
16
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limitations constitutes a valid defense for the action
to recover stock certificates wrongfully pledged in
1946, Rule 15 (b) requires its application. The case
was originally tried on the theory, based on Mrs.
Goeltz's deposition, that the cause of action did not
arise until 1950 when she demanded her stocks and
later 1nade a substitution under a nonwaiver agreen1ent. It was only after it was learned that the
stock had been stolen and pledged with forged signatures that the application of the statute of limitations to the wrongful pledge as early as 1946, became apparent. Plaintiff not only was on notice of
the situation and "suspicious" (R. 79) as early as
1947, but waited until 1950 to ascertain the true
situation as to her stocks supposedly with Ure, Pett
and Morris ( 180), and another three years to file
suit. It is hard to find any prejudice to the plaintiff
in the defendant's failure to set forth laches or the
statute of limitations. Rather, the denial of such
defense is prejudicial to defendant Bank.
III. PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING
THE VALIDITY OF THE PLEDGE OF THE KNICKERBOCKER FUND STOCK.

Despite plaintiff's inconsistent testimony as to
her endorsements of the other stock certificates, she
has al\vays admitted that the endorsement on the
Knickerbocker Fund certificate was genuine and
that it was so endorsed by her at the time she delivered it to her brokers. The facts are also undis17
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puted that plaintiff's husband had access to this account and that he did, with plaintiff's knowledge,
direct the purchase and sale of the plaintiff's securities. This is clearly shown from the record.
"Q. But, as a matter of fact, he did have
access to these stocks that were at Ure, Pett
and Morris, did he not?
A. Just because he happens to know Mr.
Morris, I guess, and no one questioned his
going in there.
Q. But he did have access to them?
A. Apparently he must have had access
or he couldn't take them out.
Q. In fact, he took and sold a great many
of them.
A. Yes, in the end he sold a great
amount. But he sold them to Ure, Pett and
Morris and din't take them out of Ure, Pett
and Morris that I know of.
Q. But at least as far as Ure, Pett and
Morris were concerned, he would come in and
take certificates out and put them in, is that
right?
A. You will have to ask Ure, Pett and
Morris that because I ha dnothing to do with
it.
THE COURT: Let me see, Mrs. Goeltz.
Did Ure, Pett and Morris sell those stocks
of yours upon Mr. Goeltz telling them to?
A. If Mr. Goeltz told them to when I was
away or, reasons like that, I sent word to
Frank.
18
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THE COURT: Well, would they do it
without a letter from you to him authorizing
1"t?.

A. Yes, they would. Strange to say.
THE COURT: In other words, they let
him handle your account?
A. Yes.
THE COURT: And did you authorize
them to let him handle your account.
A. I havenever given them any authorization; any formal authorization.
THE COURT : You knew they were being handled by him?
A. I knew that at times when Frank
would tell Spide to buy this or sell that
THE COURT: For You?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew then that Frank was buying and selling your stocks, at least selling
them at Ure, Pett and Morris and they were
honoring his orders?
A. I think that is putting it broadly, Mr.
Billings. He was not buying them.
Q. Or selling them.
A. He would tell Spide and, of course,
they would be sold in my name or bout in my
name." ( R. p. 63-64)
It is well established that where an owner has
endorsed a stock certificate and gives access and
power to dispose of it to a third party for a certain

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

limited purpose, and such third party in fact exceeds his authority and sells or pledges such stock
to an innocent person without notice of such limitation of authority, the owner is estopped from asserting title as against the innocent purchaser (See
73 A.L.R. 1405).
This court has stated this rule several times.
Thus, in Garfield Banking Co. v. Argyle et al 64
Utah 572 (1924) 232 P. 541, the owner of a certificate of stock endorsed it in blank and made it accessible to Argyle for a limited purpose. In violation
of this restriction, Argyle pledged the stock for his
own purposes. This court stated:
"* * *When she indorsed her stock certificate in blank and delivered it to the defendant
Argyle, she invested him with all the indicia
of title and ownership, and, if he abused the
confidence reposed in him and appellant suffered a loss, she, and not the plaintiff, must
bear such loss. Appellant, according to her
own testimony, indorsed the certificate in
blank and delivered it to Argyle to procure a
loan of money. True, she says that the loan
was to be for a special purpose and for a limited amount. If that be so it cannot avail her as
against plaintiff for the reason that she failed to limit Argyle's power and right to dispose of the certificate in such form as to
impart notice to one dealing with the certificate in good faith. The finding of the court is
that neither of the banks who loaned money
upon the certificate had any notice or knowledge of any limitation of power so far as
!_
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Argyle was concerned. In view of that, therefore, the equities of the plaintiff are superior
to those of the appellant." at p. 542.
In Adaras v. Silver Shield Min. & Mill. Co. et al
(1933)- 82 Utah 586, 21 P. 2d 886, this court stated
the general principle of this rule quite clearly, although in that particular case, it was held that the
subsequent transferee vv-as not a holder for value and
thus did not co1ne vv-ithin the general rule. The
court stated:
"It has almost universally been held by
the courts that, while a certificate of stock is
not a neg·otiable instrument, an owner of such
stock vvho intrusts another with his stock
certificate indorsed or signed in blank clothes
the party to whom the certificate is intrusted
with such indicia of ownership that an unauthorized sale or pledge of the certificate by
the latter to an innocent purchaser or pledgee
for value is binding upon the true owner and
prevents him fro1n asserting a paramount
interest in the shares. See long list of cases in
the note in 73 A.L.R. 1407. Most of the cases
say that the rights of the bona fide holder as
against the true owner do not depend on the
proposition that the stock certificates are negotiable paper, but rest in estoppel upon the
thf-~ory that one who has conferred upon another, by indorsement and delivery of the
stock certificate, all indicia of ownership of
the property is estopped to assert title to it
as against a third person who has purchased
it foi" value, in good faith, from the apparent
owner. It is sometimes said that, where one
of t-vvo innocent people n111st suff()r, the true
~t
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owner or the innocent purchaser, the owner,
by delivering the certificate indorsed in blank,
has enabled the third party to perpetuate the
wrong and therefore should be estopped fron1
asserting his ownership."
Of course, it is not even necessary under this
undisputed rule, to prove plaintiff's husband was
clothed with indicia of title. ·The court need never
reach that step, for it is even clearer that plaintiff's.
broker was clothed with such indicia when plaintiff endorsed the certificate of her original portfolio
in blank and placed them with her broker for more
expeditious trading.
Thus, in Re Mcintyre, (1910), 181 F. 955, the
court held that one who deposited a certificate of
stock endorsed in blank with his broker exposes himself to the risk of losing his stock on the basis of essoppel if the broker improperly pledged it to a third
party who, in turn, sold it.
In Citizens Bank v. Mutual Trust and Deposit
Co. (1924, Ky.) 266 S.W. 875, 40 A.L.R. 1001, the
court held that a person placing stock signed in
blank, together with a power of attorney, in the
hands of his broker must bear the loss of the wrongful pledge of the stock to a third party for his own
debts. See also Elliott v. Miller, 158 Fed. 868 ( 1908),
Hazard v. Powell, (1926, Ohio), 154 N.E. 357.
The record is silent as to how plaintiff's husband
acquired possession of the Knickerbocker certificatr .
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It is certain, however, that it had been delivered
and endorsed in blank to plaintiff's broker, and it
must have been an act of plaintiff's broker which
placed the certificate in circulation. Whether the
certificate was deliverd to the Bank by plaintiff's
husband or by any other third party, would not preclude operation of the rule, because plaintiff's acts
with regard to her broker could create the estoppel
independently of any authorization given her husband. The fact that the delivery was made by plaintiff's husband merely strengthens the applicability
of the rule because ( 1) we have a course of conduct whereby the transferee from the broker was
also given control over the disposition of the stock,
thereby creating an additional ground for plaintiff's
estoppel, and (2) the relationship of husband and
wife vvould make it even less likely that the bank
would question the transaction than if it were any
other party.
With theses facts in mind, it is clear that the
trial court erred in failing to find plain tiff estopped
by her own conduct from asserting title to the
Knickerbocker Fund certificate.
IV. TI-IE BANI{ HAD NO NOTICE OF INFIRMITY IN THE KNICKERBOCKER FUND CERTIFICATE.

The trial court has found that there was no
agency between plaintiff and her husband (Finding
of Faet No. 7, R. 147) and that the Bank had notice
2 ')

._)
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of this absence. (Finding of Fact No. 14, R. 148).
Whether there was or was not such a relationship has no necessary bearing on the rights of the
bank, with regard to the Knickerbocker Fund certificate. (If the relationship of principal-agent did exist between plaintiff and her husband, the banl{'s
rights would, of course, be even stronger, but the
absence of the relationship is not fa tal to it) .
The Bank is not contending that it dealt with
plaintiff's ht1sband in any capacity but as a principay. The Bank contends, and there is no evidence
to disprove this, that it treated the pledged stocks
as that of plaintiff's husband. In fact, the record
shows without dispute that the loan was made to
Mr. Goeltz alone on the security of the stocks which
were all apparently his (as they were endorsed in
blank so as to be in street form), the proceeds of
the loan were credited to Mr. Goeltz's individual account at the Bank (Ex. 5) and carried on the ledger
card in his name alone (Ex. 7). The Bank merely
urges that regardless of agency, plaintiff, by endorsing the Knickerbocker Fund certificate and clothing
her broker and her husband with indicia of ownership, is estopped to assert her title as against the
Bank (see supra).
Thus, as the existence of agency between plaintiff and her husband is not essential to the establishment of tl1e bank's case , the fact of notice or

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

non-notice of its existence is irrelevant.
The sole relevancy of notice with regard to the
Knickerbocker Fund would be as to whether the
Bank took it with notice of plaintiff's improper possession of this particular certificate. There is no
finding by the trial court to this effect.
Finding of fact No. 14 (R. 148) states, somewhat vaguely that defendant "was charged with
notice of forgery of plaintiff's name" on the other
certificates and promissory notes and "was bound
by said notice or knowledge as to all stocks herein
involved." vVhat the nature or basis of such "notice"
is we cannot determine from the findings and we
submit that it cannot be found from the record.
It was not until over four years after the pledge
that plaintiff commenced her claim against the
Bank. There is not even an allegation of actual notice
by officers of the Bank of any infirmity in the
Knickerbocker Fund certificate before this. (See
com plaint, R. 1-3) . Nor are there any findings as
to constructive notice as to the Knickerbocker Fund
certificate. What the court meant by "notice" and
how it bound the Bank "as to all stocks" remains
unexplained.
The sole possible basis for this finding is shown
by certain statements made in colloquy between the
court and counsel ( R. 127-128). It was there suggested that if the forgeries on the other certificates
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(which at that time were not available as evidence)
were of such obvious and flagrant nature that any
reasonable and prudent man would know that they
could not have been made by the sa1ne person as.
the original signature on the Knickerbocker Fund
certificate, the Bank might have been placed on notice of some irregularity in all the certificates.
The court made no finding on this question. Indeed, a comparison of the signatures on the three
certificates (see exhibits 14, 15 & 16) even when
removed from the documents and placed side by side,
shows no dissimilarity marked enough to place a
man of affairs on notice that the certificates were
all not properly endorsed.
This assumes, of course, that a patent dissimilarity would be notice of invalidity. Even this is not
necessarily the case. A patently dissimilar signature could well have been made with the owner's
authorization and might be perfectly valid and binding. (In the instant case, this was not true, but it
would not affect the question of notice which ultimately rests on reasonableness. O'Reilly v. McLean,
84 Utah 551, 37 P. 2d 770.
Thus, whatever the extent of the Bank's rights
as to the other certificates, it is clear that there can
be no "contamination" by this of its rights as to the
Knickerbocker Fund certificate, where estoppel of
plaintiff clearly applies. The court has made no find26
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ing of notice as to absence of authority to deal with
this particular certificate. Nor, it is submitted,
would the facts of record justify such a finding. The
validity of the pledge of each certificate must turn
on its own facts and on this basis, Plaintiff is precluded from asserting rights as to the Knickerbocker Fund stock.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing. it is submitted that
plaintiff's claim against the Bank is barred by the
statute of limitations, and by reason thereof, the
judgment below should be reversed and judgment
entered for the Bank, no cause of action.
It is further submitted that even if the statute
of limitations be not applicable, the Bank is a lawful pledgee of the Knickerbocker Fund certificate.
The plaintiff having received $816.00 net from the
sale thereof in 1950, the Bank is entitled to
that amount from plaintiff before it can be required
to deliver the certificates of Douglas Aircraft and
Goodyear Rubber stock now held by it in lieu thereof.
Respectfully submitted,
PETER W. BILLINGS
ALBERT J. COLTON
Fabian, Clendenin, Moffat & Mabey
Attorneys for Appellant
Salt IJake City, Utah
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